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Procedural Safeguards May Not Be Enough
Buraczynski v. Eyring'
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance companies and physicians increasingly are requiring medical
malpractice claims to be settled by arbitration.2 As a result, many patients are being
presented with a new choice when they enter their doctor's office: Sign an
arbitration agreement or forgo treatment with their physician.
In Buraczynski v. Eyring, the physician required the patients to sign an
arbitration agreement prior to performing medical services for them? The agreement
contained provisions designed to ensure that the patient made an informed decision
before consenting to the agreement.4 But what if there were no other doctors
available if the patient chose not to sign?
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On September 11, 1990, Carolyn Bridges underwent total knee replacement
surgery under the care of Dr. Edward Eyring and his assistant, Becky Phillips.5 Two
months later Bridges signed an arbitration agreement with Dr. Eyring, initialing a
retroactive clause in the agreement.6 Shortly after signing the arbitration agreement,
Bridges began experiencing difficulties with her newly replaced knee.' She
eventually consulted with another orthopedic surgeon who indicated that the
prosthesis had been improperly applied.8 Because the first procedure was faulty,
Bridges underwent a second knee surgery, replacing the first prosthesis with a lesser
quality joint.9
1. 919 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1996).
2. See generally, Eleanor Kinney, Malpractice Reforms in the 1990's: Past Disappointments,
Future Success?, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 99 (1995).
3. 919 S.W.2d at 317.
4. Id.
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On December 3, 1990, Helen Parker also entered into an arbitration agreement
with Dr. Eyring, which was identical to the agreement between Eyring and Bridges. 0
On February 26, 1991, Dr. Eyring and Becky Phillips performed a total knee
replacement on Parker." In June of 1991, following numerous complications and
an infection, Helen Parker died. 2 Appellants Beverly Buraczynski and Stanley
Parker are Helen Parker's children. 3
The arbitration agreements signed by Bridges and Parker were adhesion
contracts offered to the patients on a "take it or leave it" basis.'4 The agreements
covered all medical negligence and malpractice claims arising out of the doctor-
patient relationship and bound not only the patient, but her spouse and heirs as
well.'5 The contract provided that the physician was bound by the arbitrator's
decision regarding medical malpractice claims and fee claims for disputed
treatments. 6 Additionally, patients had thirty days from the time they signed to
revoke the agreement by submitting written notice to Dr. Eyring."7
Appellants Beverly Buraczynski and Stanley Parker and appellant Carolyn
Bridges filed separate malpractice actions against Eyring and Phillips.IS In response,
Eyring and Phillips petitioned to have the arbitration agreements enforced against
both appellants.'9 The trial court conducted a joint hearing in which it found that the
arbitration agreements were not contemplated by the Tennessee Arbitration Act and
were unenforceable as contracts because they lacked consideration.2"
The cases were then consolidated for appeal to the Tennessee Court of
Appeals.2' The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, finding that
despite the "uniquen contractual relationship between physician and patient, the
Tennessee Arbitration Act applied and the contract was supported by adequate
consideration.22
The Supreme Court of Tennessee granted certiori to consider the validity of the
physician-patient arbitration agreement.' On appeal, appellants argued that the
arbitration agreements between the doctor and his patients were void as against













22. Buraczynski v. Eyring, No. 1994 WL 677487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
23. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 317.
24. Id. at318.
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enforceable." Additionally, Bridges argued that the statute did not apply to
retroactive arbitration agreements.26
Doctor Eyring argued that the agreement was not void as against public policy,
distinguishing Olson v. Molzen,27 a case involving an exculpatory clause which
limited the physician's liability.28 He also argued that the agreement was not too
broad, pointing to other courts that did not require specificity in physician-patient
arbitration agreements.29 Finally, Eyring asserted that retroactive arbitration
agreements have been uniformly upheld in other courts if the patient was aware of
the retroactive provisions in the agreement.3"
The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the court of appeal's decision.3' The
supreme court found that the physician-patient arbitration agreements were
consistent with public policy, were not overly broad, and were enforceable adhesion
contracts because they were supported by consideration and were not oppressive or
unconscionable.32
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1983, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted the Tennessee Arbitration
Act ("TAA").33 Derived from the Uniform Arbitration Act,34 the TAA defined the
parameters of arbitration in Tennessee. Section 29-5-302(a) of the statute provides
that arbitration agreements are valid, except for agreements that would ordinarily not
be enforceable in law or equity based on general contract principles." The statute,
however, does not address the validity of physician-patient arbitration agreements
in the medical malpractice context. Further, no Tennessee court has ever considered
the issue of the validity of physician-patient arbitration agreements. Prior Tennessee
cases and the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act, however, have established a
public policy favoring dispute resolution through arbitration, not litigation.
When deciding issues of first impression, Tennessee case law and the
Tennessee Arbitration Act recognize the desirability of looking to the law of sister
states construing the uniform acts. Section 29-5-320 of the TAA provides that
provisions under the Act shall be construed to effectuate the uniform purpose of the
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 558 S.W.2d 429 (renn. 1977).





33. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-301, et seq. (1983).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 29-5-302(a).
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states adopting uniform acts.36 In 1985, in Holiday Inns v. Olsen,37 the Tennessee
Supreme Court stated that when opinions of other states are within the spirit of the
Tennessee statute and do not offend state public policy, the legislative intent of
uniformity will be upheld by following the decisions of sister states.3 8 In 19,91, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals applied this reasoning in its decision in Wachtel v.
Shoney's, Inc. 9 In Wachtel, the court relied on the method of statutory construction
set forth in Olson to rely on Nevada law in construing a provision of the Uniform
Arbitration Act adopted by both states.' Similarly, because the issue in Buraczynski
was one of first impression, the Tennessee Supreme Court followed earlier
Tennessee decisions in looking to sister states for precedent on the interpretation of




In 1987, the California Court of Appeals in Hilleary v. Garvin42 found that an
arbitration agreement between a physician and patient covered the continuing
professional relationship, not just the initial treatment.43 In Hilleary, the patient
entered into the arbitration agreement with the treating doctor prior to treatment for
vaginal bleeding and an exam to determine if she was pregnant.' During a follow
up visit, the doctor recommended surgery to prevent the diagnosed condition from
recurring.45 The subsequent surgery was the subject of the patient's malpractice
claim."
The California Court of Appeals found that the arbitration agreement signed
before the initial treatment was binding because it complied with the mandates of the
California Arbitration Act, § 1295,'4 which covers physician-patient arbitration
agreements.48 The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the agreement covered
only the initial treatment sought and found the contract unambiguous despite its lack
of specificity in delineating covered procedures and treatments.49 On this point, the
36. Id. § 29-5-320.
37. 692 S.W.2d 850 (Tenn. 1985).
38. Id. at 853.
39. 830 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
40. Id. at 909.
41. 919 S.W.2d 314, 318.
42. 238 Cal. Rptr. 247 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
43. Id. at 250.
44. id. at 248.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(a) (West 1975). Adopted in 1975, this statute defines the
requirements for a valid arbitration agreement between physicians and patients.
48. Hilleary, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
49. Id.
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court stated that such delineation was "neither required by the statute nor normally
expected by a patient.""
In 1988, in Gross v. James Recabaren, MD., Inc., the California Court of
Appeals again addressed the issue of the scope of an arbitration agreement."' In
Gross, the patient signed an arbitration agreement prior to the doctor removing two
benign masses from the patient, which required no further treatment."2 Eighteen
months later the patient returned to have a lesion on his nose examined. 3 The lesion
was malignant and radical surgery was required. 4 The surgery for the malignant
lesion on the patient's nose was the subject of the malpractice claim underlying the
arbitration dispute."5
The patient argued that the arbitration agreement covered only the services
rendered contemporaneously with its signing. 6 The court rejected this argument,
stating that the agreement cannot reasonably be said to be limited to the
contemporaneous services.5" The court stated, "To impose upon a physician, during
a continuous doctor-patient relationship, the extra burden of having to renew the
arbitration agreement each time there is a variation in treatment or ailment would be
impractical and would frustrate the purpose of the [arbitration] statute .... "11
Further, the court found that neither party could have reasonably considered the
relationship terminated after the treatment of the benign moles.5 9 The court looked
at the patient's return to the physician for subsequent treatment and at the doctor's
billing methods as evidence of an on going relationship.' Because the disputed
treatment was part of an ongoing physician-patient relationship, the court held that
the arbitration agreement was enforceable. 6'
In 1993, the California Court of Appeals considered another aspect of the
permissible scope of physician patient arbitration agreements. In Coon v. Nicola,62
the court considered the validity of a retroactive clause in an arbitration agreement. 63
Following treatment for a fractured wrist, plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement
during a follow-up visit with the doctor." The agreement included a provision
entitled "Retroactive Effect", which made the agreement effective as of the date of
50. Id.
51. Gross, 253 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).




56. Id. at 822.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Hilleary v. Garvin, supra at 42).
59. Id. at 824.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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the first medical services. 65 The provision was specifically initialed by the plaintiff
when the agreement was signed.' Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a suit for
malpractice, claiming the arbitration statute did not authorize retroactive
agreements.67
The California Court of Appeals found that the statute did not preclude
retroactive agreements from being incorporated into an arbitration agreement even
though the statute did not address retroactive agreements specifically.68 In its
decision, the court relied on contract principles which are generally applicable to
retroactive contracts and on public policy favoring arbitration.69 The court
concluded that "as long as the provisions of section 1295 [of the California Code of
Civil Procedure] are met as to a medical malpractice arbitration agreement, parties
may legally agree to arbitrate pre-agreement claims. " '°
B. Adhesion Aspect of the Agreement
In 1985, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a lower court's ruling invalidating
a physician-patient arbitration agreement in Obstetrics and Gynecologists William
G. Wixted, MD., Patrick M Flanagan, MD., William F. Robinson, MD. Ltd. v.
Pepper.7 In Pepper, the patient signed an arbitration agreement prior to receiving
a medical examination and a prescription for oral contraceptives from the clinic.72
Standard procedures at the clinic required the patient to sign the arbitration
agreement and complete two other forms prior to receiving treatment." The clinic
staff was available to answer questions, but the patient had no recollection of the
agreement being explained to her.74 The agreement did not provide the patient with
an opportunity to revoke the agreement, therefore, when the patient signed she could
not regain her right to a jury trial.75
The Nevada Supreme Court found that although the district court had entered
no findings of fact or conclusions of law, the district court could have found the
agreement unenforceable because it was an unacceptable adhesion contract.76 The
Nevada Supreme Court defined an adhesion contract as a standardized contract
offered on a "take it or leave it" basis." The court also noted that the defining




68. Id. at 850.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 851.
71. 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985).





77. Id. (relying on Miner v. Walden, 422 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979)).
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terms of the contract. 7 The court found, however, that an adhesion contract is not
necessarily unenforceable if it tracks the reasonable expectations of the weaker party
and if it is not unduly oppressive. 9 Because the district court could have found that
the patient in this case was not alerted to the agreement or its consequences, so that
she did not give her informed consent and so that no meeting of the minds occurred,
the supreme court upheld the district courts decision. 0 The arbitration agreement
was, therefore, unenforceable.8 '
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Arizona in Broemmer v. Abortion Services of
Phoenix Ltd 82 considered the enforceability of a physician-patient arbitration
agreement.8 3 Prior to undergoing an abortion procedure at an abortion clinic,
plaintiff was given three forms to complete and return before services would be
rendered." Included in the three forms was an agreement to arbitrate any dispute
arising out of treatment. 5 The agreement contained provisions limiting potential
arbitrators to doctors specializing in obstetrics or gynecology." Plaintiff completed
and returned all three forms in less than five minutes, receiving no counsel from the
staff of the clinic and no notice of the arbitration agreement's existence.8 7
The Arizona Supreme Court relied on Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital" in
defining an adhesion contract as one offered on a take it or leave it basis in which the
weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms and cannot obtain the desired
services elsewhere. 9 Because the arbitration agreement in Broemmer was a form
contract offered to plaintiff on a take it or leave it basis and because the selection of
arbitrators provision was potentially advantageous to the doctor, the court found that
the agreement was an adhesion contract.'
The court noted, however, that finding that the agreement was an adhesion
contract was not determinative of its enforceability.9' The court looked at the two
judicially imposed limitations on the enforceability of adhesion contracts enunciated
in Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.' to determine if the Broemmer adhesion contract was
enforceable.93 In Graham, the court stated that to be a valid adhesion contract, an
agreement must fall within the reasonable expectations of the parties and not be
78. Id. (relying on Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)).
79. Id. at 1261 (relying on Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172-73 (Cal. 1981)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992).
83. Id. at 1015.
84. Id. at 1014.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. ld. at 1015.
88. 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
89. Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1015-16.
90. Id at 1016.
91. Id.
92. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
93. 840 P.2d at 1016.
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unduly oppressive or unconscionable.' The Broemmer court found that although
adhesion contracts are not per se unenforceable, the agreement in this case was
unenforceable because it exceeded the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff.' The
court, therefore, did not need to determine if the contract was unconscionable.'
The dissent in Broemmer disagreed with the majority's opinion that the contract
was beyond the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff.7 The dissent argued that
the majority's decision was without basis in fact or law and displayed a preference
for litigation.9" Looking at the face of the arbitration agreement, the dissent pointed
to the wording, "AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE", at the top of the contract and
to the capitalized heading of the agreement advising the patient to read the
agreement carefully before signing." The dissent argued that there was nothing in
the record indicating that arbitration of a malpractice claim was beyond the
reasonable expectations of the parties."°
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Buraczynski v. Eyring, the Tennessee Supreme Court was asked to decide if
a physician-patient arbitration agreement was enforceable or if it was void as against
public policy.'0 ' Because this was an issue of first impression, the court looked at
the history of arbitration in Tennessee and at the law of sister states to form the basis
of its decision."° The court followed the mandate of the Tennessee Arbitration
Act0 3 which directs that the opinions of other state courts should be considered in
construing the uniform act to "effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
laws of those states which enact it.""°4 The court also relied on Holiday Inns v.
Olsen,' where the court held that the decisions of sister states were relevant in
construing uniform acts even though they were not binding upon Tennessee
courts. °
94. 623 P.2d at 172-73.
95. Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1017. In deciding if the agreement was beyond the plaintiffs reasonable
expectations, the court looked at the factors listed in Obstetrics and Gynecologists William G. Wixted,
M.D., Patrick M. Flanagan, M.D., William F. Robinson, M.D. Ltd. v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev.
1985); Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388 (Ariz. 1984); and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
96. Id.




101. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d 314, 317.
102. Id. at318.
103. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-320 (1996).
104. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 318.
105. 692 S.W.2d 850 (Tenn. 1985).
106. Buracyznski, 919 S.W.2d at 318.
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After establishing the basis on which it would make its decision, the court
considered the policy arguments proposed by the parties, focusing on the general
public policy favoring alternative dispute resolution.17 The court began by noting
the fact that no court has ever broadly rejected arbitration agreements in the medical
services area.'18  The court then looked at the Tennessee Legislature's act of
adopting the U.A.A. as an indication of a legislative policy favoring arbitration.109
The court further noted its own rule promulgating court-administered alternative
dispute resolution." 0 While recognizing the special relationship between patients
and their doctors, the court found arbitration to be as useful in the medical context
as in any other."' The court noted that arbitration agreements designate an
alternative forum, but do not limit liability."2 Therefore, the court joined the
"unanimous authority" from other states in finding that physician-patient arbitration
agreements are not per se void as against public policy.' '3
The court then considered the scope of the particular arbitration agreements
challenged in the instant case. The court first looked to California case law to decide
if a physician patient arbitration agreement must be limited to a specific surgery or
course of treatment or if it could encompass the entire medical relationship." 4 The
court relied on Hilleary v. Garvin.. in approving the broader type of arbitration
agreement." 16
In adopting the reasoning of the California court, the Tennessee court noted the
similar scope of the agreements in Hilleary and the present case." 7 In ruling that the
breadth of the agreements did not render them unenforceable, the court stated that
imposing a burden to renew an arbitration agreement at each variation in treatment
in a continuous doctor-patient relationship would frustrate the purpose of the
arbitration statute which is "to facilitate, not emasculate" the arbitration process."18
The court then considered whether the retroactive provision requiring
arbitration of the suit arising from prior medical treatment was too broad to be
enforceable. The court looked to the language of the Tennessee Arbitration Act to
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing Stanley Henderson, Contractual Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to
Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REV. 947, 956 (1972) and Arbitration of Medical Malpractice







115. 238 Cal. Rptr. 247 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). See also Gross v. James A. Recabaren, M.D., Inc.,
253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
116. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 319. The court found the language of Hilleary to be applicable
despite its reliance on a California arbitration statute which specifically addressed medical arbitration
agreements. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Hilleary, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 250).
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decide if retroactive clauses are enforceable."I9 The statute provides that agreements
to arbitrate "any controversy thereafter arising" are valid and enforceable except
upon such grounds as exist in law or equity.120 The court reasoned that Bridges
agreed to submit to arbitration any future controversy arising out of past medical
treatment by initialing the clause pertaining to previously rendered care. 2'
Therefore, relying on the language of the statute and Bridges's knowledge of the
retroactive clause, the court found that the retroactive clause was enforceable.' "
The next issue facing the court was the adhesion aspect of the agreement. The
court began its analysis by defiming an adhesion contract."z Noting that other
jurisdictions consider the adhesion issue under general contract principles, 24 the
court defined an adhesion contract as "a standardized contract form offered to
consumers of goods and services on essentially a 'take it or leave it' basis, without
affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions
that the customer cannot obtain the desired product or service except by acquiescing
to the form of the contract.""2 The court also noted that the defining feature of an
adhesion contract is that a party with less bargaining power has no real choice in the
terms of the contract. 26 The court then looked at the facts of the instant case and
found that the agreements were standardized form contracts offered to the patients
on a "take it or leave it" basis. 27 The court further found that if the patients had not
signed the agreements, the result would have been a loss of the desired medical
services from Dr. Eyring.Iu Therefore, the court concluded that the arbitration
agreements were adhesion contracts.
29
The court's analysis did not end with the determination that the agreements
were adhesion contracts. Instead, the court stated that finding that the agreements
were adhesion contracts did not foreclose the agreements' enforceability. 30 Again
citing Broemmer, the court stated that "enforceability generally depends on whether
the terms of the contract are beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary
person, or oppressive or unconscionable," noting that courts will not enforce
adhesion contracts which disserve the weaker party while limiting the liability of the
119. Id.
120. Id. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302(a)(1983).
121. Id.
122. Id. See Coon v. Nicola, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 850-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
123. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 320.
124. Id See Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992); Leong
by Leong v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 788 P.2d 164 (Haw. 1990); Obstetrics and Gynecologists William
G. Wixted, M.D., Patrick M. Flanagan, M.D., William F. Robinson, M.D. Ltd. v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259
(Nev. 1985); Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Cal. CL App. 1976).
125. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 320 (citing Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1015 and Black's Law
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stronger party.'3 ' The court recognized that, in general, courts will not enforce
physician-patient arbitration agreements hidden in other contracts when the
agreements: (1) give the patient no right to question the terms or purpose of the
agreement, (2) require the patient to choose between forever waiving their right to
jury trial or forgoing necessary medical treatment, and (3) give the physician an
unequal advantage in the arbitration process itself.32
Examining the agreements in the present case, the court found that they
contained none of the oppressive aspects discussed above.13 It noted that the
agreements in the present case were separate documents entitled "Physician-Patient
Arbitration Agreement," with short explanations attached encouraged the patients to
discuss any questions with Dr. Eyring.' The court found no unfair advantage given
to the doctor by the agreement.'35 The court pointed to the terms of the contract
which (1) entitled each side to choose one arbitrator (the two of whom would then
choose a third), (2) bound Dr. Eyring to the arbitrator's decision concerning not only
the medical malpractice claim, but disputed fee claims as well, and (3) notified the
patient that he or she was relinquishing his or her right to a jury trial and gave the
patient thirty days to reclaim that right. 36 Additionally, the court noted that the
retroactive provision was addressed in a separate clause which the patient was
required to initial.' The court found that the most important element in determining
whether the adhesion contracts were enforceable was whether the arbitration
agreements changed the doctor's duty of care or limited his liability.' Because the
court found that none of the provisions of the contract were unconscionable,
oppressive, or outside the parties' reasonable expectations, it held that the
agreements were enforceable.'39
The court summarized its findings by stating that physician-patient arbitration
agreements are not per se void as against public policy and that the specific
agreements in the present case are enforceable."4 The court cautioned that
agreements of this type "must be closely scrutinized to determine if unconscionable
or oppressive terms are imposed upon the patient which [would] prevent
enforcement of the agreement."' 4'
V. COMMENT
131. Id.
132. Id at 321. See Pepper, 693 P.2d at 1260; Beynon v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 161 Cal.
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The Tennessee Supreme Court correctly applied the law of other jurisdictions
to the facts of Buraczynski. Its decision, however, should not be interpreted as a
broad approval of physician-patient arbitration agreements. While recognizing a
number of elements which guard against procedural unfairness, the court also
recognized the potential for oppressive or unconscionable terms and conditions
being employed which would render this type of arbitration agreement
unenforceable. 42 The court cautioned that adhesion-type arbitration agreements
should be closely scrutinized for such oppressive and unconscionable terms.'43 The
analysis should proceed beyond the provisions of the contract and include an
examination of the true extent of the patient's ability to choose whether or not to
sign the agreement.
The Buraczynski court pointed to several procedural safeguards rendering the
physician-patient arbitration agreements enforceable.'" The court noted that the
agreements were separate documents, not hidden in other pre-admission forms, and
that the agreements contained short explanations. 45 Also, the agreements did not
provide an unfair advantage to the doctor or limit his liability." Furthermore, the
patients were informed in capitalized red type that they were surrendering their right
to ajury trial and had thirty days to revoke the agreement.'47 While these elements
certainly are effective procedural safeguards, they are protecting the patient's right
to make an informed choice before signing a contract forfeiting the right to a jury
trial. In modem practice, however, the patient may not have the option of choosing
another doctor. Therefore, these procedural safeguards which protect the patient's
right to make an informed decision may not be enough.
An estimated 40 million Americans belonged to health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) in the early 1990's."" HMOs limit their subscribers' choice
of physicians to those affiliated with the insurance company in order to reduce costs.
If the affiliated doctors require patients to sign an arbitration agreement as a
prerequisite to treatment, patients may be left with no alternative but to sign the
agreement simply because they are not authorized to seek treatment from another
physician and still receive insurance coverage. As HMOs become more common,
more people may find themselves being forced to sign adhesion contracts forfeiting
their right to a jury trial without the choice of selecting another doctor as the
Buraczynski court assumed was possible.
In Buraczynski, the court characterized the patient's decision as a choice
between signing the agreement and being treated by the doctor offering the
agreement or simply choosing another physician. 49 Although the court
142. Id.
143. Id.




148. See Jacob S. Hacker, National Health Care Reform: An Idea Whose Time Came and Went, 21
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 647, 655 (1996).
149. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 320.
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acknowledged the difficulty in abandoning an established physician-patient
relationship, it did not consider that the choice for many patients may really be
between signing the agreement, foregoing treatment completely, or forgoing health
insurance coverage.
The modem trend toward managed care may severely limit the patient's choice
of physicians. Hypothetically, if the patients in Burac2ynski were members of an
HMO which designated Dr. Eyring as the only covered orthopedic surgeon in their
coverage area, the patients would be forced to choose between forgoing their right
to a jury trial and foregoing treatment or insurance coverage. That is really no
choice at all.
The Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged that these types of medical
malpractice arbitration agreements are adhesion contracts.' The court hinged
enforceability upon the parties' reasonable expectations and upon a determination
of whether the agreement was oppressive or unconscionable."' The court
determined that the agreements in the present case were enforceable because they
were in essence fair because they afforded procedural safeguards to the patients.5 2
Focus on procedure, however, may be missing the larger issues involved in
physician-patient arbitration agreements. With the high cost of health care, treatment
without insurance coverage is certainly oppressive. Most people cannot afford to
refuse to sign an arbitration agreement if that refusal means no treatment or no
insurance coverage. Furthermore, the right to a jury trial is a constitutional
guarantee."' Patients are being asked to choose between foregoing a constitutional
right and foregoing medical treatment. This choice is far too oppressive and
unconscionable for any procedural safeguards to cure. Before courts step in and
enforce agreements denying one party a constitutional right, they should consider the
realistic choices which that party has and what that party is receiving in exchange.
The judiciary needs to be aware of the changing landscape of the medical services
industry in making decisions that will help shape that landscape.
VI. CONCLUSION
Arbitration is an excellent means of alternative dispute resolution in the medical
malpractice area, but it should not be imposed upon unwilling patients. Arbitration
should be encouraged - not required. The Buraczynski court reached the correct
conclusion for the particular facts of the case presented to it, but that decision should
not be expanded without considering the realistic options available to patients.
Assuming.patients may simply choose another physician is a leap that cannot be
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 321.
153. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Additionally, forty-eight state constitutions guarantee the right to
ajury trial. See Paul Weiss, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh Amendment?,
38 CATH. U. L. REv. 737, 738 (1989).
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made in the present state of health care. Approval of arbitration agreements signed
by patients with no realistic choice is not the right decision for health care consumers
in the modem health care system.
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